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Alongside Samuel Beckett and John Osborne, the Nobel prize winner Harold 
Pinter is one of the most studied playwrights of contemporary British drama. 
With his dreamlike rooms and settings, his enigmatic plots and powerful 
characters, the author can claim a place among the best dramatists in the 
world. His plays have been chronologically categorized as “Comedies of 
Menace” (1957-1968), “Memory Plays” (1968-1982), “Political Plays and 
Sketches” (1980-2000). His “Memory Play” Silence is one of the most difficult 
and obscure and also one of the least studied.  
In this article, I investigate the relationship between the speaking sub-
jects in Silence and their discourses. Their speech is the presentation, the 
materialization, of their inner linguistic chora (cf. Kristeva 1986, 90-136) and 
through their words the characters construct their own time, space, and 
memories. By doing a close reading of the text, I argue that, though written in 
1969, this play can be considered post-dramatic ahead of its time as “the 
phonetic materiality, the temporal course, the dispersion in space, the loss of 
teleology and self-identity” (Lehmann, 2006, 148) dominate the drama.  
In particular, I will refer to the subject as an entity under construction, in 
perpetual transformation; as Karoline Gritzner states: “the theatre provides an 
imaginary space for subjects-in-process (Kristeva) – speaking and moving 
subjects (characters, performers, spectators) whose experiences of becoming 
are linked to the theatrical negotiations of alterity” (2008, 331). On the other 
hand, the critic of postmodernism Fredric Jameson, in his essay “Postmodern-
ism and consumer society”, has talked about the “death of the subject”, 
understood as the old “individual subject” of the bourgeoisie. In the age of 




capitalism this old subject is dead and maybe has never even existed. By 
contrast, I argue here that the subject is not dead, the self just shows itself now 
as multifaceted and deconstructed, the subject has no borders any more.  
The poetic, fragmented, disjointed structure of the play recalls the con-
cept of platonic chora mentioned by Lehmann who considers it as a “space 
and speech/discourse without telos, hierarchy and causality, without fixable 
meaning and unity” (2006, 146). In addition, Julia Kristeva, in her theory of 
the “subject in process”, had already claimed that the process of creation of 
the subject and of language derives from two modalities, namely the semiotic 
and the symbolic functions. The heterogeneous flux that is the semiotic chora 
is where the subject is generated. In Silence we recognize characters as trying 
to position themselves, therefore moving from the semiotic to the symbolic 
realm of the signifying process. The play itself is a sort of reiterated thetic 
phase or second-degree thetic, that is “a resumption of the functioning charac-
teristic of the semiotic chora within the signifying device of language. This is 
precisely what artistic practices, and notably poetic language, demonstrate.” 
(Kristeva 1986 (1974), 103). In particular: 
In the case, for example, of a signifying practice such as ‘poetic language’, the 
semiotic disposition will be the various deviations from the grammatical rules of 
the language: articulatory effects which shift the phonemative system back to-
wards its articulatory, phonetic base and consequently towards the drive-
governed bases of sound-production; the overdetermination of a lexeme by mul-
tiple meanings which it does not carry in ordinary usage but which accrue to it 
as a result of its occurrence in other texts; syntactic irregularities such as ellipses, 
non-recoverable deletions, indefinite embeddings, etc. ; the replacement of the 
relationship between the protagonists of any enunciation as they function in a 
locutory act – see here the work of J. L. Austin and John Searle – by a system of 
relations based on fantasy; and so forth. (Kristeva 1986 (1973), 28-29) 
Indeed, poetic language substitutes movement and body action almost com-
pletely in the play. Nevertheless, the function of the spoken word is not a 
communicative one, and its power lies not only in the substitution of move-
ment but also, and most importantly, in the depicting and structuring of time 
and place shifts. As Stanton Garner brilliantly points out,  
time is spatialized by memory and localized as it is staged in the linguistically 
conditioned scene of remembrance. For their part, the “places” brought forward 
through conversation remain situated within the problematic field of temporality 
bound to a past unreliable in outline and detail. To contest the field of time and 
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memory, in other words, is to contest space in its verbally conditioned modes, 
whereas to evoke the offstage is often, in the plays, to disclose its temporal con-
tours. (1994, 147) 
This very brief play, which presents three characters in three different areas, is 
really compelling for the reader/spectator who has to piece together the 
fragmented past recollected by the three characters. Ellen is a young woman in 
her twenties, Rumsey a man of forty, and Bates is in his thirties. Time and 
space are not specified. We do not know where and in what period of their 
lives the characters are. We can even argue that they are not in the same place 
and are not sharing their space-time, hence the three different areas to which 
they are relegated. There are almost no stage directions about the actors’ 
movements apart from a movement by Bates towards Ellen, and two move-
ments by Ellen towards Rumsey, who, by contrast, remains still for the whole 
drama. These moments introduced by the movement of a character towards 
another always end in silence. Since they stand aside from the rest of the text 
they might be viewed as sort of flashbacks to several past levels.  
As reported in Harold Hobson’s review of the première in The Sunday 
Times, which is worth mentioning since it takes into account the audience 
response, “The audience has to piece together into some sort of shifting 
coherence the fragmented details of the partly recollected past, and in each 
case what is important is not the past, but the continuing influence that this 
past exercises on the present which is before our eyes on the stage” (1969). 
Along with the hardly moving, separate bodies of the actors, language thus 
shapes the space-time dimension which moulds identities.  
The action does not happen today, yesterday or tomorrow, but simulta-
neously at all the three levels of time, which, as Merleau-Ponty alleges, are all 
implied in the present time as retrospection and projection. The characters’ 
words thus literally materialize past, present and future events and identities. 
The place recalled is a rural one, in the countryside. There are several refer-
ences to a river, fields and hills, animals such as dogs, cows, horses, and birds; 
the weather is always cloudy and windy. Although movement is almost absent 
in the play, it is evoked by words: “walk” is repeated 25 times and the author 
uses other movement-related words such as “turn”, “wheel”, “glide”, “slip”, 
and “float”.  
After Rumsey has opened the play describing his girl, who always wears 
grey clothes for him, it is Ellen’s turn to remember two men: 




ELLEN  There are two. One who is with me sometimes, and another. He listens 
to me. I tell him what I know. We walk by the dogs.  
Sometimes the wind is so high that he does not hear me. I lead him to a tree, 
clasp closely to him and whisper to him, wind going, dogs stop, and he hears me.  
But the other hears me. (Pinter 1997, 191-92) 
We can now focus on “but”: the adversative conjunction following the state-
ment that one managed to hear what she was saying presupposes that the 
other could not, or that he could “as well”, or “too”. The adversative conjunc-
tion here confuses the reader because it is not actually consistent with the text. 
And yet, we should notice that the last adversative sentence is separated from 
the rest of the paragraph, which means that it could be a lonely monad of 
memory detached from the previous one. It seems that both men share the 
same event, the same place and time recalled, but Ellen’s line can refer to two 
different memories or representations. In this play Pinter actually makes 
brilliant use of perceptions and points of view, of contrasting memories which 
all claim their veracity. The task of collecting pieces to create a cohesive uni-
fied story is almost impossible for the reader and unattainable for the spect-
ators who find themselves in the relentless hic et nunc of the performance.  
Bates then talks about a pub in town run by a cousin of his. He claims to 
have brought Ellen there, but later Ellen denies it. At this point it is Rumsey 
who talks about Ellen and recollects a moment which is crucial for this analy-
sis: “She walks from the door to the window to see the way she has come, to 
confirm that the house which grew nearer is the same one she stands in, that 
the path and the bushes are the same, that the gate is the same. When I stand 
beside her and smile at her, she looks at me and smiles” (192). The use of the 
verb “to walk” to denote the woman’s movement towards the window lays 
emphasis on the repositioning of the point of view: in order to ensure the 
identity of the path, the spatial coordinates and the house, the woman needs 
to redirect her gaze. Moreover, the movement does not merely signify a 
change in position, but also a shift of perspective, since what Ellen seeks is a 
view from a height 1. It seems that she needs to be above the path she has 
followed in order to confirm the place, or to be able to remember something, 
as we shall see later.  
1  Merleau-Ponty has also studied the relationship between subject and space, and 
about an object perceived he pointed out that “Its being as an object is, therefore, not a 
being-for-the-thinking subject, but a being-for-the-gaze which meets it at a certain angle, 
and otherwise fails to recognize it. ” (1962, 253).  
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All three characters have lost their bearings, they no longer have any ori-
entation, or direction and this lack of spatial – and temporal – references 
characterizes their speech, their broken syntax and sentences, their silences. 
The few movements they perform and those they recall represent an attempt 
to localize time and locate memories.  
Now, in relation to broken syntax and disconnected discourse, Jameson 
alleges that schizophrenic experience, for instance, is characterized by the 
impossibility to construct a “coherent sequence” of signifiers, and therefore is 
a “language disorder”, as Lacan considered it: “The experience of temporality, 
human time, past, present, memory, the persistence of personal identity over 
months and years – this existential or experiential feeling of time itself – is also 
an effect of language” (Jameson 1985, 119). By contrast, whenever time is 
perceived as a simultaneity of past, present and future, language goes adrift, it 
loses its linearity and cohesion, which is precisely what happens in the play. 
According to Kristeva in fact, “All poetic ‘distortions’ of the signifying chain 
and the structure of signification may be considered in this light: they yield 
under the attack of the ‘residues of the first symbolizations’ (Lacan), in other 
words, those drives that the thetic phase was not able to sublate by linking 
them into signifier and signified” (1986 (1974), 103). Therefore, the fragment-
ed discourse in Silence shows the characters’ movements along the binary 
semiotic-symbolic rather than their “schizophrenic” inability to make use of 
language, so that their being is always “in between”.  
Language in particular dictates the flow – or throwback – of time thanks 
to its evocative power. The characters’ age, for instance, is never the same: 
when the two men talk about their past, it seems that they are in their mid-life. 
Bates, who is supposed to be in his thirties, says “someone called me Gran-
dad” and Ellen also talks about herself as an old woman. She even says: “She 
asks me about my early life, when I was young, never departing from her 
chosen subject, but I have nothing to tell her about the sexual part of my 
youth. I’m old, I tell her, my youth was somewhere else, anyway I don’t re-
member” (194). What is absolutely fascinating is the spatialization of a time in 
life which becomes something that “moves” and goes “somewhere else”, 
youth is objectified and “forgotten” as it is estranged by the woman. We see 
characters at a certain age but their discourses reveal that they may well be 
older than that, which suggests that what we see may not be the present time. 
Bates, Rumsey and Ellen might inhabit the past with their bodies and speak in 
the present with their voices. Conversely, their bodies might live in the present 
while their speaking voices might be ‘projected’ towards the future. Hence 




Ellen’s question on her own age later in the play: “I seem to be old. Am I old 
now?” (201). Therefore, it could be helpful to consider what Merleau-Ponty 
said about the relationship between the subject and time:  
We are saying that time is someone, or that temporal dimensions, in so far as 
they perpetually overlap, bear each other out and ever confine themselves to 
making explicit what was implied in each, being collectively expressive of that 
one single explosion or thrust which is subjectivity itself. We must understand 
time as the subject and the subject as time. (1962, 422) 
Pinter thus succeeds in putting on stage the split between both past and 
present, and body and speech, but at the same time he keeps them together so 
that we see the “textuality of the remembered self” (Begley 2005, 137).  
Greimas and Courtés’ study on the enunciation and a narrative semiotics 
might help us retrace the discursive complexity of Silence both in terms of 
enunciation – an act conveying meaning – and of the resulting utterance. What 
is central is the concept of enunciation which is “an instance where trans-
formation takes place, transformation that goes from the (available) system, of 
a paradigmatic type (e. g. on the phonological level, all the phonemes of a 
natural language), to an utterance or to a syntactically actualized discourse” 
(1976, 434), while the utterance is considered as the evental representation 
(436). Furthermore, the two scholars identify two different subjects, the 
cognitive subject and the subject of doing. While the former is the logical 
arranger of the narrative endowed with total knowledge of events, the latter 
has only a partial knowledge and is considered an actant of narration, instead 
of communication. In light of the opposition between being and appearing, 
Greimas and Courtés point to four cognitive positions in the knowledge of 
events (440): 
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Following Greimas’s square, then, we might argue that this play is not about 
true or false events. What stands out instead, is a state of secrecy from the 
point of view of characters who are old but do not appear as such, and a state 
of delusion from the spectators/readers’ point of view, who perceive characters 
as young though they are not.  
A movement triggers the first flashback when Bates moves towards Ellen 
and they suddenly start talking about where to go that night. Bates suggests 
going to the pub run by his cousin, but Ellen refuses. And yet in a former line 
Bates recalls taking Ellen there: “Brought her into this place, my cousin runs 
it. Undressed her, placed my hand.” (192). Referring to this problematic 
excerpt the British writer and theatre critic Ronald Hayman has tentatively but 
convincingly suggested that: “Perhaps the sequence in which we are watching 
events is not the sequence in which they happened” (1969, 85). What we 
actually see in the play is that what happens is not aligned with memories 
recalled and that the characters’ experience of the events narrated is often 
partial or self-contradictory.  
“I walk in my mind. But can’t get out of the walls, into a wind” (197) 
Bates claims, but soon after he maintains that he was talking to his “little girl” 
about birds resting on trees. Out of the blue, Ellen produces an amazing 
description of herself running “over the grass”, “turning” and “wheeling”, as 
if she were flying like a bird, and as if she were actually a bird: “When I run … 
when I run … when I run … over the grass … […] I turn. I turn. I wheel. I 
glide. I wheel. In stunning light. The horizon moves from the sun. I am 
crushed by the light” (198). Unlike Bates, who only walks in his mind and 
“can’t get out of the walls into a wind” (197), Ellen soars up in the air, as her 
point of view shifts from “walks” to flights. Still, since Ellen’s dreamy fantasy 
of herself “running over the grass” also reminds one of the “little girl” Bates 
has just mentioned, we might surmise that Ellen’s vision belongs to a very old 
memory of childhood, which Bates might have shared. Rumsey then oddly 
remarks: 
RUMSEY  Sometimes I see people. They walk towards me, no, not so, walk in my 
direction, but never reaching me, turning left, or disappearing, and then reap-
pearing, to disappear into the wood. So many ways to lose sight of them, then to 
recapture sight of them. They are sharp at first sight … then smudged … then 
lost … then glimpsed again … then gone (198)  
These cryptic lines contribute to the creation of confusion due to the people’s 
quick and almost unnatural movements: the man conveys a way to see people 




– who swing between being in and out of focus – that is comparable to the
focalisation of a camera lens. Therefore, it is worth considering that what 
moves may also be Rumsey’s ‘memory lens’, rather than people. He might 
superimpose different memories when trying to describe a past event, thus 
showing the combinatorial nature of memory through people’s ‘movements’. 
Moreover, the adverb “sometimes” may suggest that he does not always see 
people, that maybe he is able to effectively see – which we might understand 
as remember – them only “sometimes” and “somewhere”.  
Towards the end of the play Ellen makes a similar assertion saying that 
she is not able to capture the people she comes across during the day: “After 
my work each day I walk back through people but I don’t notice them.” (204). 
Thus, both descriptions are indicative not only of the elusiveness of percep-
tion, but also, and most importantly, of the vagueness of memory. This shows 
that what the characters produce is always a re-elaborated version of past 
events, made up of layers of memories refocused on different targets.  
Another flashback follows, this time with Ellen moving towards Rumsey. 
They recall his home and they remember when Ellen was there last time, when 
she was young. It is a memory within the flashback, during which, at one 
point, the man suggested that Ellen looked at her reflection in the mirror, 
which is not consistent with Ellen’s earlier memory of what we presume to be 
the same event: “One time I visited his house. He put a light on, it reflected 
the window, it reflected in the window” (192). In fact, what Ellen remembers 
being reflected is not herself, but the lamplight. As she remembers, Ellen, of 
course, might have substituted herself with the lamplight or she might not 
have been interested from the start in looking for her reflection in the window. 
This proves how different points of view and perspectives may utterly change 
the way we experience the same events.  
Divergent perceptions or perspectives also emerge in the ways Rumsey 
and Bates recollect the past or experience the present with Ellen as the only 
common denominator between them: 
RUMSEY    She was looking down. I couldn’t hear what she said.  
BATES       I can’t hear you. Yes you can, I said.  
RUMSEY    What are you saying? Look at me, she said.  
BATES         I didn’t. I didn’t hear you, she said. I didn’t hear what you said.  
RUMSEY     But I am looking at you. It’s your head that’s bent. SILENCE (201-202) 
In either case, what the other says is beyond the reach of hearing or under-
standing. Ellen’s “bent” posture in Rumsey’s description matches one of 
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Ellen’s own memories where she was sitting “on his knee” (201). And yet, it 
contradicts Bates’s claim that “The little girl looked up at me” (201-202) as 
well as his talking about horses exactly as Rumsey did earlier. Moreover, this 
moment when the effort to hear and understand is unsuccessful could coin-
cide with Ellen’s recollection (as previously quoted) of bringing two men 
under a tree, and that one could not hear her, but the other could.  
Once again we see Ellen moving towards Rumsey in one more flashback, 
after which she says enigmatically:  
ELLEN  I go up with the milk. The sky hits me. I walk in this wind to collide with 
them waiting. There are two. They halt to laugh and bellow in the yard. They dig 
and punch and cackle where they stand. They turn to move, look around at me 
to grin. I turn my eyes from one, and from the other to him. (203)  
The verbs to walk and to collide used by Ellen in relation to the wind may 
suggest a sort of zoomorphism with flying animals once again. Moreover, 
other verbs such as bellow, dig, and bark can also refer to animals. To bellow 
may refer both to a human shout and to cows – which are often mentioned – 
and dig may refer to either animals or human beings. However, an interesting 
phrase is “cars barking” said by Bates at the beginning of the play. The verb 
can convey the harsh sound of cars, but it could also refer to “dogs barking”, 
matching the animal kingdom – mainly represented by Ellen and Rumsey – 
with the urban life linked with Bates. These references to zoomorphism and 
urbanism are worth noticing because they depict the characters’ action of 
combining pieces of memories once again: they show an internalisation of 
animals’ behaviour and urban environment that characters detected and their 
superimposition on recollections. Rumsey’s words soon after give us a clue to 
make out that the “up” used by Ellen might refer to the top of a hill: “On 
good evenings we walk through the hills to the top of the hill past the dogs the 
clouds racing” (204).  
The fragmented syntax of the excerpts quoted so far is a case of “ellipsis 
or syntactic non-completion” which, as Kristeva suggests, “can be interpreted 
as the thetic break’s inability to remain simply intra-syntactic – a division 
within a signifying homogeneity. A heterogeneous division, an irruption of the 
semiotic chora, marks each ‘category’ of syntactic sequence and prevents the 
‘other’ from being posited as an identifiable syntactic term” (1986 (1974), 108).  
Then the two men repeat their first lines (“RUMSEY I walk with my girl 
who wears – BATES Caught a bus to the town. Crowds. Lights round –”, 204) 
while Ellen remarks that memories of people she had not taken note of at first 




sight, surface back, even if partially, only later and only when she is back in 
her room:  
ELLEN It is only later, in my room, that I remember. Yes, I remember. But I’m 
never sure that what I remember is of to-day or of yesterday or of a long time 
ago. And then often it is only half things I remember, half things, beginnings of 
things. (204) 
Ellen’s memory is bound to the “room” space – a recurrent setting in many of 
Pinter’s works – and yet, even there, Ellen still fails to organize her memories 
chronologically. The vagueness and instability of individual memories are 
typical features of Pinter’s “Memory Plays”, but what we find here is some-
thing slightly different and more specific: it is a scattering of perspectives, each 
of which claims its own veracity, a mosaic of entropic points of view. From 
this point onwards, and right to the end, Pinter’s characters resume their 
previous lines, albeit inconclusively. The only addition is the obsessive reitera-
tion of Silence – in Pinter’s stage directions, as if to mark the gap that sepa-
rates each voice from the others:  
ELLEN       I kiss them there and say Silence  
RUMSEY   I walk Silence  
BATES      Caught a bus Silence  
ELLEN     Certainly. I can remember the wedding. Silence 
RUMSEY   I walk with my girl who wears a grey blouse  
BATES     Caught a bus to the town. Crowds. Lights round the market 
Long silence. Fade lights (209) 
The eternal return, conveyed by the resumption of lines, is one of the most 
frequent obsessions of Pinter’s characters, though in this case the focus is not 
the impossibility to recollect and accept the past – like for example in Old 
Times and Ashes to Ashes. Silence does not mark a pause and not even a long 
one. It points instead to a fracture, the “threshold” that allows movement 
through space and time. Silence is the emptiness that separates each molecule 
of thought and memory differentiating them from each other: it enables 
characters to rearrange new ‘versions’ of past events, so that they can start 
again their recollections in an endless cycle. In fact, this circular abstruse 
structure of the play has been concisely summarised by Clausius in this over-
view: 
The first part comprises thirteen movements or sections divided either by a de-
liberate silence or by blocking. The second part recapitulates in its entirety the 
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first part in the same chronology but with Ellen’s interruptions. Part three be-
gins yet another recapitulation which starts the play again from the beginning 
and then ends it as soon as this cycle has been established. (1995, 30) 
Therefore, what the play actually puts forward is the way subjects experience 
time, before they arrange it in a linear succession. Hence the ongoing becom-
ing and regressing of the self, like a flux which moves freely between the 
temporal axes, among past and present identities, and between the semiotic 
and the symbolic. There are then not just three characters but at least twice as 
many, since everyone shows him/herself at different points in time. The 
circular structure of the play, with no neat point of departure or arrival, 
besides being anticipatory signals of post-dramatic theatre, illustrates what 
Merleau-Ponty has argued about the “restarting of Time”: 
What does not pass in time is the passing of time itself. Time restarts itself: the 
rhythmic cycle and constant form of yesterday, today and tomorrow may well 
create the illusion that we possess it immediately, in its entirety, as the fountain 
creates in us a feeling of eternity. But the generality of time is no more than one 
of its secondary attributes and provides only an inauthentic view of it, since we 
cannot get as far as conceiving a cycle without drawing a distinction, in terms of 
time, between the point of arrival and the point of departure. (Merleau-Ponty 
1962, 423) 
In conclusion, what we see, hear and experience by reading or watching the 
play is the interaction between different perspectives and perceptions, not a 
fight between truth and its fabrication. What Rumsey, Bates and Ellen say is 
not false or illusory, it is only their “thetic” way to signify reality. As Kristeva 
points out, “The thetic – that crucial place on the basis of which the human 
being constitutes himself as signifying and/or social – is the very place textual 
experience aims towards. In this sense, textual experience represents one of 
the most daring explorations the subject can allow himself, one that delves 
into his constitutive process” (1986 (1974), 117). On the “threshold”, in the 
silence that is the end of a movement but also the beginning of another, there 
is no specific place and time, no fixed identity, but only the reign of possibi-
lities of Kristeva’s Subject-in-process and the circularity of Merleau-Ponty’s 
Subject as time. With this dramatic work – in the interplay between voices and 
silences, between broken sentences and movements – Pinter brilliantly suc-
ceeds in presenting the subject’s journey across space-time, towards its own 
signifying process.  
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ABSTRACT 
The article investigates Harold Pinter’s play Silence from a linguistic and 
phenomenological point of view. Silence is probably one of the least studied – 
though one of the most difficult and compelling – of Pinter’s plays. The 
author identifies the broken syntax and the combination of utterances and 
silences as indicators of time and space shifts. She claims that the patchwork 
which appears from the structure of the play depicts the loss of logic, and that 
the abandonment of chronological time in linguistic terms conveys the subjec-
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tive, circular, and illogical element of the human experience of time. Charac-
ters’ bodies and utterances materialize both their own past recollections and 
their present experiences. The present work may be useful to theatre scholars 
as an example of drama as a portrayal of philosophical and linguistic theories 
about time and discourse.  
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